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WITHIN THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN:
WESTERN STATES AND THEIR RIVER
BASINS IN A TIME OF TRANSITION*
JOHN M. VOLKMAN" AND KAI N. LEE*"
I. INTRODUCTION

After many years of looking to big dams to supply water in arid
areas, there is a consensus that we must make better use of water from
existing facilities instead of building new storage dams. As a Western
Governors' Association working group put it recently, "promoting
water use efficiency at all levels of government is a critical task of
water policy in the next decades of western water use. . . . [T]here is
broad awareness in the West that the region has entered a different era
in water, an era characterized by enhanced management, increased use
of non-structural solutions to meet demand. . . , and cognizance of the
growing value of water in non-consumptive, instream uses." There
are many forces pushing us into this new era — the absence of good
new dam sites, demands for instream uses, the environmental impacts
of dam construction, sharply declining federal funding for water
projects, and an increasing awareness that conservation may be less
costly than building major new dams. These forces all point to nonstructural water solutions — making better use of existing water supplies instead of building new dams — as solutions of first resort.2
The new era, however, will face obstacles of its own. Nonstructural solutions are not inexpensive,3 and they come at a difficult time.
The cost of operating and maintaining existing water systems is climb• We dedicate this article to our late colleague Jody Lawrence, who taught us much about river
basin planning and whose insights would have benefited this article.
•• Senior Counsel, Northwest Power Planning Council, Portland, Oregon.
••• Associate Professor, Environmental Studies and Political Science, The University of
Washington.
I. WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION WATER EFFICIENCY WORKING GROUP, WATER EmCIENCY: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 3 (1987) (report to the Western Governors).
2. Nonstructural solutions include water transfers, water conservation and salvage, conjunctive
use of substitutable supplies, and providing alternative water supplies to senior users. See B. Dalvea,
WESFERN WATER: TUNING THE SYSTEM V (1986).
3. See Marston, They Built Better Than They Knew, in WESTERN WATER MADE SIMPLE 157,
158 (High Country News 1987) ("(Tjhe billions spent on this plumbing will now be dwarfed by tens of
billions to be spent to modify it, to mitigate its impacts, and to buy out old water users and put the
plumbing to new uses. The era of massive construction is about over; the much more expensive era of
nudging the river into a modified shape is just beginning.").
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ing, federal funding for water projects is drying up, and state and local
budgets are strained. In addition, the new era will require an unprecedented degree of cooperation in planning, management and investment among water users and institutions. Western water is
administered by a mix of independent-minded local, state, federal and
private actors, each resisting interference by the others.4 Creating new
lines of cooperation will be difficult.
Most of the answers to these challenges must come from the state
and local levels, traditionally the front lines of western water law and
administration. But federal agencies also play a significant role. Federal multipurpose dams have harnessed the West's great rivers for irrigation, hydroelectric power generation, and other uses. The federal
dams have two important resources to offer the new era of water management: First, they retain a series of storage reservoirs that could be a
significant source of water savings. 5 Second, the dams' hydroelectric
facilities generate billions of dollars in revenues that might help fund
nonstructural water solutions.
The question addressed in this article is whether western states
should play a more direct role in guiding the federal dam system and
its hydropower revenues in the new era of nonstructural water solutions. This discussion builds from a precedent that is working in the
Pacific Northwest. There, a four-state planning body — the Northwest
Power Planning Council — develops plans for energy and fish and
wildlife needs for the Pacific Northwest and the Columbia River Basin. These plans are implemented by or through federal agencies and
financed by hydropower revenues. The question is whether the Northwest model is adaptable to water problems in other river basins.

H. WESTERN RECLAMATION, FEDERAL HYDROPOWER, AND
STRATEGIC PLANNING IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST

A. Federal Reclamation and Hydropower Development
Before describing the Northwest system and how it might be
adapted to other basins, it is important to understand the development
of the federal reclamation and hydropower systems in the West, and
how they are interrelated.
4. See Mann, Institutional Framework for Agricultural Water Conservation and Reallocation in
the West A Policy Analysis, in WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN 'THE WESTERN U.S.: CONSERVATION,
. REALLOCATION, AND MARKETS 18 (Weatherford S. 1982) [hereinafter cited as WATER AND AGRICULTURE]; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER ISSUES FACING THE NATION: AN OVERVIEW 7 (1982).
5. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER
PROBLEMS: How TO REDUCE THEIR IMPACT 46-47 (1979).
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1. Western River Basin Development Before the
Reclamation Act

rJ

Commentators have suggested that large-scale water systems
built for irrigation are part of a "hydraulic trap": the infrastructure
required to provide water for irrigation, once built, demands extraordinary resources for its maintenance, a corps of experts to operate
it, and cheap labor to harvest its fruits.' But this was not the view in
the later 19th century, when westerners faced the prospect of settling a
dry and inhospitable land. The eastern United States, by and large, did
not require irrigation; rainfall was sufficient to grow crops. The West
raised an entirely new problem. West of the 100th meridian, settlers
"encountered an obstacle beyond the power of the individual settler to
overcome. This obstacle was aridity — the failure of the rainfall to
meet the demands of agriculture."' The experience of the Mormons in
Utah and others showed that arid lands could be made productive
through irrigation, but irrigation could not be accomplished by individuals acting alone; cooperation was required.' With hindsight, we
may see the antidemocratic, anti-environmental elements of irrigation
in sharper relief. To its early proponents, however, the idea of irrigation was a revelation. It offered not only a way to grow food, but a way
to organize western society through "associative enterprise.' Properly developed, irrigation would promote egalitarian communites,
avoid monopolistic land and water practices, and create "a long series
of beautiful villages. n10
Irrigation's early visionaries drew on the hard-headed scientific
work of government surveyors such as John Wesley Powell. In the
1870's, Powell proposed to conduct a comprehensive irrigation survey
identifying reservoir, ditch and canal sites, and showing what lands
were irrigable. Once the survey was complete, irrigable lands would be
opened to settlers with suitable acreage limitations." By directing agricultural development to irrigable land, Congress could "prevent mistaken, impossible, or monopolistic irrigation schemes, inefficient use of
water, confusion between upstream and downstream rights to rivers,
and the failures of small homesteaders.'
6. See D. WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEst 50 (1985).
7. W. SMYTHE, THE CONQUEST OF ARID AMERICA 17 (1907 ed.).
8. See SMYTHE, supra note 7, at 31; WoRsrER, supra note 6, at 74.
9. SsirrNE, supra note 7, at 32. As Smythe put it, irrigation is not "merely an adjunct to agriculture. It is a social and industrial factor, in a much broader sense." Id. at 42.
10. Id. at 57.
II. See Woanta, supra note 6, at 139. See also Stegner, The Function of Aridity, in WILDERNESS, Fall 1987, at 16.
12. W. STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN 332 (1954).
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In Powell's view, western government should be organized along
the natural boundaries of river basins. Settlers within the basins would
have the right to store and use the water within basin boundaries, and
to organize enterprises to finance irrigation works." Major rivers
would be dammed, and large reservoirs would store water on the
mainstems of the rivers and in mountainous areas far from farm
land." These developments would essentially be self-financing:
[T]he increment of value given to lands by reason of their being
irrigated is sufficient to pay the cost of constructing the irrigation
works many times over. So there is no need of any Government
aid."
Settlers would build their own diversion structures, supplying labor in
place of capital. Where capital was essential, they would secure bank
loans for larger investments, putting up their land as security.' The
federal government's role would be interstitial. It would survey lands,
set acreage limits on homesteads based on water conditions, and resolve disputes that the basins themselves could not resolve. Otherwise
the river basins would be self-governing.
In 1888, as a logical first step for a comprehensive irrigation survey, public lands were reserved from settlement to prevent settlers
from occupying prime sites for reservoirs and irrigation works." This
provoked a "perfect storm of indignation" from the West," and the
irrigation survey was rejected, "stomped to death" by Congress." So
was Powell's vision of self-financing, self-governing river basins. Private capital proved too limited and unsteady to finance large irrigation
projects, at least at the pace demanded by an impatient country."
Powell's engineering plans, however, were taken up and adapted by
irrigation advocates, who argued that western irrigation was too large
a challenge without federal help.'
13. See Wortsthit, supra note 6, at 138.

14. See R. CLARK, 2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 110.1 1 at 118 (1967); WORSTER, Dire note
6, at 134.
15. 11 U.S. Geol. Survey Annual Report, part 2, at 252 (1889 1890) (quoted in 2 CLARK, supra
note 14, § 110.1, at 118-19).
16. WORSTER, supra note 6, at 140.
17. Act of Oct. 2, 1888, 25 Stat. 527 (cited in California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 659
(1978)).
18. 29 CONG. REC. 1955 (1897) (cited in California, 438 U.S. at 659).
19. STEGNER, supra note 12, at 337.
20. For a first-hand account of the difficulties in developing major irrigation projects in the era
before federal reclamation programs, see A VICTORIAN GENTLEWOMAN IN THE FAR WEST, THE REMINISCENCES OF MARY HALLOCK FOOTE 284-86, 324-27 (R. Paul ed. 1972).
21. See SstrrtiE, supra note 7, at 144.
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2. The Reclamation Program
Turn-of-the-century reclamation promoters had grand visions.
At the International Irrigation Congress meeting in 1893, irrigators
talked as though the entire public domain could be irrigated, and
booed Powell when he told them otherwise.' Powell estimated that
100,000,000 acres, or 12 percent of the arid land then in federal hands,
might be irrigated." In fact, the reclamation program's contribution
to western agriculture has not been as significant as either Powell or
the 1893 Irrigation Congress hoped. In 1975, about 37.4 million acres
of land were under irrigation in the 17 western states,' and of this
only 7 million acres, or 20 percent, were irrigated with federally-developed water." The remaining 80 percent of western water supplies,
mainly local water diversions achieved at moderate expense, are
nonfedera1.26
The federal reclamation program began in earnest with the enactment of the Reclamation Act of 1902. 27 In the beginning the program
was funded modestly. Financing was to come from the proceeds of
public land sales, to be repaid by water users within ten years." Repayments would go into a revolving fund from which further reclamation projects would be financed.
The modest scope of the initial program did not last. What began
as a self-financed plan to benefit small western farms grew into a program dominated by an "iron triangle" of large-scale agriculturalists,
federal reclamation engineers, and Western congressmen who operated the reclamation program as a closed enterprise financed by congressional appropriations." Begun in the hope that proceeds from
land sales would suffice to propel the West to agrarian self-sufficiency,
22. STEGNER, supra note 12, at 262.
23. Id. at 343; WORSTER, supra note 6, at 139.
24. J. MATHER, WATER RESOURCES: DISTRIBUTION, USE AND MANAGEMENT 125 (1984).
25. See id. at 123; WATER AND AGRICULTURE, supra note 4, at 17.
26. See MATHER, supra note 24, at 123-26.
27. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372-616 (1982)). Precursors of the Reclamation Act were the Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377 (1877), which provided
for homesteads on large tracts of arid land and severed water from land title (see California Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 195 U.S. 142 (1935)), and three statutes adopted in the
1890's that opened public land to settlement and encouraged the formation of reclamation projects
subject to state regulation. See Act of Aug. 30, 1890, 26 Stat. 371, 391; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat.
1095, 1101; Act of Feb. 26, 1897, 29 Stat. 599. See also California, 438 U.S. at 659-61.
28. See Swigart v. Baker, 229 U.S. 187 (1913); SMYTHE, supra note 7, at 275; Roos-Collins, Voluntary Conveyance of the Right to Receive A Water Supply From the United States Bureau of Reclamation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 773, 803 (1987).
29. WORSTER, Supra note 6, at 52-53, 281; M. REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT THE AMERICAN
WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 319-24 (1986). For an analysis of the congressional pork barrel, see MATHER, supra note 24, at 315-16.
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the reclamation program became instead a durable dependency of
Congress.
Reclamation has been an expensive dependent. Water from reclamation projects is much more expensive than nonfederal sources of
water." All told, the federal government has invested more than $54
billion in water projects nationwide, 3I and construction costs may be
the least of the burden. Operation and maintenance costs of the federal projects are rising as dams age, reservoirs fill with silt, and canals
deteriorate. In 1982 the General Accounting Office painted a stark
picture of reclamation's physical legacy:
Operation and maintenance costs are . . . skyrocketing, thereby
taking a larger portion of the (federal) budget . . . . In fiscal year
1982 that cost is expected to exceed $1 billion or almost one-third
of the [Army Corps of Engineers] civil works budget. While such
costs are already staggering, they can only increase.32

The reclamation system also has left a political legacy. In the
1970s, the program began losing its power in Congress. Since 1972,
federal funding for new major water projects has been rare, and "the
old Congressional alliances that sustained national programs of water
supply, electric power, navigation, and flood control are crumbling."33
Westerners, accustomed to relying on federal funding for water
projects, must look to new sources of funding.
3. The Financial Relationship Between Federal
Reclamation and Federal Hydropower
Hydropower generation started out as an incidental benefit of irrigation dams,' but later assumed enormous importance in reclamation
development." Although the Reclamation Act originally required
water users to repay reclamation project costs, this requirement gradually was diluted, so that in most cases irrigators have not paid the full
30. See MATHER, supra note 24, at 125-26.
31. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER ISSUES FACING THE NATION: AN OVERVIEW 11

(1982).

32. Id. at 2.
33. G. TOLLEFSON, BPA & THE STaticote FOR POWER AT Cos-r 412 (1987). As a western
senator put it recently, "When I came to the Senate there was not a single person on the old Interior
Committee on our [Republican] side, or on Senator Melcher's [Democrat] side, who was not from a
Western state. Now where are we? A I-vote margin." 133 CONG. Rec. S5989 (daily ed. May 6, 1987)
(statement by Senator Hatfield).
34. "The hydroelectric potential of these early projects, so important today, was then often purely
secondary and, in the case of the Flood Control Act of 1944 that governs the present case, was nearly
forgotten entirely." United States v. Tex-La Elec. Co-op., Inc., 693 F.2d 392, 393 (5th Cir. 1982).
35. 2 CLARK, supra note 14, § 122.1, at 244.
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cost of their water." Instead, repayment obligations were determined
by the users' ability to pay, with payments spread over lengthy repayment periods at no interest. 3' The remaining costs were accounted for
by crediting hydropower revenues to the irrigators' accounts," and by
allocating congressionally-appropriated funds to publicly financed
project purposes such as navigation, flood control, or recreation." In
this manner, reclamation became a highly subsidized program,' and
hydropower, once viewed as a minor incident of federal projects, became a primary part of reclamation's economic justification.'
The hydropower system's financial commitment to the reclamation system is significant, although so far this commitment is largely
theoretical. In 1985, the General Accounting Office estimated that
$14.1 billion in irrigation costs were scheduled to be recovered •
through power revenues.' As of 1985, however, no hydropower revenues had actually been used to repay reclamation costs." As a general
matter, hydropower revenues are not used to actually repay reclamation costs until the cost of hydropower facilities is repaid." One
power marketing administration made its first irrigation repayment in
1985, and another plans to begin in 1997.' Thus, hydropower reve36. Id., § 112.3(C), at 146.
37. Id., § 123.1, at 255; Roos-Collins, supra note 28, at 784. New reclamation contracts are governed by the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa - 390zz-1 (1982).
38. See 2 CLARK, supra note 14, § 123.2(1), at 272; Roos-Collins, supra note 28, at 815 (citing
Rucker & Fishback, The Federal Reclamation Program: An Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior, in
WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (T.
Anderson S. 1983). See also REISNER, sun note 29, at 140-42.
39. See 2 CLARK, supra note 14, 4123.2(A), at 258-59.
40. "[O]n six irrigation projects we recently reviewed, the Federal Government's cost to provide
the water ranged from $54 to $130 per acre-foot .... Yet, the users paid only $0.27 to $9.82." U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER ISSUES FACING THE NATION: AN OVERVIEW 24 (1982).
41. See United States,. Tex-La Elec. Co-op., Inc., 693 F.2d 392, 393 (5th Cir. 1982); 2 CLARK,
supra note 14, § 122.1, at 244.
"(P)ower has become the principal source of [reclamation program] revenue, paying not only its
own costs, but subsidizing a part of the irrigation burden as well. While it is universally understood
that power is to pay those costs allocated to irrigation construction which are beyond the ability of
irrigators to repay, such an arrangement is nowhere authorized in the general reclamation laws." 2
CLARK, supra note 14, § 123.2(1), at 272; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RECOVERING A PORTION OF FEDERAL IRRIGATION PROJECT CONSTRUCTION Corn THROUGH DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ELECTRIC POWER SALES 4-5 (1985).
42. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING IRRIGATION PROJECT COSTS AND PRICING FEDERAL POWER 9 (1985). Of this amount, $13.4 billion is for
projects that have been authorized but not built. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RECOVERING
A PORTION OF FEDERAL IRRIGATION PROJECT CONSTRUCTION CaSTS THROUGH DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY ELECTRIC POWER SALES 2 (1985).

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1988: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Energy and Water Development tithe House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 6, at 1590, 1626, 1667 (1987).
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nues have been part of the economic justification for reclamation
projects, but so far have not returned much of the federal investment.
4. The Role of the Federal Power Marketing
Administrators
Multipurpose federal dams play a significant role in western energy systems." While there are regional variations,' overall nearly
forty percent of the West's generation capability comes from hydropower facilities." Federal projects in the West are owned by the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation (51 projects), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (26 projects), and the International Boundary and Water Commission (3 projects)."
Energy from the federal projects is transmitted and marketed by
the U.S. Department of Energy, through five power marketing administrations." The power marketing administrations sell wholesale
power to public and private utilities consistent with federal power
marketing policy," according to rate schedules approved by the Fed46. K. LEE & I. CLARK, THE WESTERN HYDRO SYSTEM 6 (1985).
47. Sixty-four percent of the West's hydroelectric capacity is located in the Northwest, 23 percent
in the Southwest, and 13 percent in the Missouri River Basin. Id.
48. WESTERN SYSTEMS COORDINATING COUNCIL, COORDINATED BULK POWER SUPPLY PROGRAM, 1986-96 iv-v (1987).
49. LEE & CLARK, supra note 46, at 6.
50. The power marketing administrations include the Bonneville Power Administration and the
Western Area Power Administration (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 59-61), the Southwestern Power Administration, with authority to manage the Army Corps of Engineers' projects in
Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma and Texas (see 10 Fed. R. 14,527-28 (1945)), and
the Southeastern Power Administration, with marketing authority in southeastern states (see Electricities of N. C. v. Southeastern Power Admin., 774 F.2d 1262, 1264 (4th Cir. 1985)). The United States is
in the process of divesting itself of the Alaska Power Administration. See Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1988: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and Water Development of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st Sea, pt 6, at 1368 (1987). The Tennessee Valley
Authority has broad development authorities that go beyond power development. See 16 U.S.C.
•§ 831-83Idd (1982).
51. Formerly, federal marketing policy was reflected in a variety of statutes and administered by
two different agencies, the Department of Interior and the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) (see The Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat.
1057 (1928), 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617u (1982); The Bonneville Project Act of 1937, ch. 720, 50 Stat. 731
(1937), 16 U.S.C. §§ 832-8321 (1982); The Fort Peck Act of 1938, ch. 250, 52 Stat. 403 (1938), 16
U.S.C. §§ 833-833q (1982); The Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, 53 Stat. 1187 (1939), 43
U.S.C. §§ 375, 387-89, 485485k; The Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 890 (1944), 16
U.S.C. § 825s (1982); The Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C.
¢§ 838g-838k (1982); and The Pacific Northwest Preference Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 837-837h (1982)). Congress attempted in 1977 to centralize and streamline the administration of these laws in the Department
of Energy in the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7152(a) (1982). See
United States v. Fulton, 475 U.S. 657 (1986); United States v. Tex-La Elec. Co-op., Inc., 693 F.2d 392,
395 (5th Cir. 1982). After some initial confusion, the Department of Energy reshuffled the administration of these laws in 1978, delegating ratemaking approval authority to the independent Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. See 43 Fed. Reg. 60,636-37 (1978).
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eral Energy Regulatory Commission.' Rates are designed to repay

the costs of construction, operations, maintenance, repair and other
costs associated with hydroelectric generation and marketing." Generally, federal power must be offered first to public utilities and electric
cooperatives; only after these "preference customers" have been served
may power be sold to private, investor-owned utilities.'
Two power marketing administrations operate in the West: the
Bonneville Power Administration ("Bonneville"), which covers the
Columbia River basin, and the Western Area Power Administration
("WAPA"), which covers most of the rest of the West, including the
Missouri and Colorado River basins and California. WAPA markets
power from 51 generating plants with more than 9 million megawatts
of installed capacity, owns 16,000 miles of transmission lines, and generates more than $630 million in annual revenues." Bonneville markets power from 30 generating facilities with more than 20 million
megawatts of installed capacity, owns 14,000 miles of transmission
lines,56 and anticipates generating more than $3.16 billion in revenues
and reimbursements in fiscal year 1988."
B. State-based Planning for Federal Hydropower Systems
The power marketing agencies are federal, and historically have
not shared power with the states in which they operate. In 1980 this
pattern of federal control shifted with respect to Bonneville, the larger
of the western power marketing administrations. Bonneville's Pacific
Northwest service territory provides the most fully-developed example
of regional control of a federal hydropower system.
1. Bonneville and the Columbia River Hydropower System
Reclamation is important in many parts of the Pacific Northwest,
but the Columbia River's development has been dominated by the hy52. See United States v. Fulton, 475 U.S. 657 (1986); United States v. Tex-La Elec. Co-op., Inc.,
693 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1982); Department of Energy, Power Marketing Rates, Delegation Order for
Confirmation and Approval, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,636-37 (1978); Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839e(i)
(1982).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 839e(i) (1982).
54. See Comment, The Meaning of the Preference Clause in Hydroelectric Power Allocation Under
the Federal Land Reclamation Statutes, 9 ENVTL. L. 601 (1979); Redman, Preference and Other
Clauses in Federal Power Marketing Acts, 13 ENVTL. L. 773 (1983).
55. Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1988: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Energy and Water Development of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at
1222 (1987).
56. Id., pt. 6, at 1412.
57. Id., pt. 4, at 1117. Bonneville's revenues and receipts in fiscal year 1986 totalled
$2,967,8130,0X See Bonneville Power Administration Budget for Fiscal Year 1987, at B-8 (1986).
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dropower capabilities of the federal dams. Because it was plentiful for
so long, and remains relatively cheap, federal hydropower marketed
by the Bonneville Power Administration has had pervasive influence
in the region's power system."
Bonneville is unique among the federal power marketing administrations not only for its size and influence, but for its autonomy." In
1974, Congress freed Bonneville from the vagaries of the congressional
appropriations process, which were seen as inhibiting the efficient construction of the region's power transmission grid." In the Columbia
River Transmission System Act, Congress established the Bonneville
Power Administration Fund as a revolving fund to receive revenues
from the sale of federal power from the Columbia River dams."
Bonneville may spend from the fund for many purposes without a congressional appropriation." Under the Transmission System Act,
Bonneville is virtually self-financing.
Bonneville's influence over the operation of the Columbia River
dams is dominant, but not exclusive. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers operates 20 multipurpose dams in the Columbia River Basin."
The Bureau of Reclamation operates the largest storage dam on the
Columbia, Grand Coulee, a number of multipurpose dams on the
Snake River, and reclamation projects in the arid parts of the region."
Nonfederal utilities, public and private, and major industrial customers also play a significant role in the region's power system." The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates a number of
nonfederal hydropower projects."
58. See Hittle, Larson, Randall & Michie, Pacific Northwest Power Generation, Multi-Purpose Use
of the Columbia River, and Regional Energy Legislation: An Overview, 10 Dont. L. 235, 276 n. 178
(1980); Hemmingway, The Northwest Power Planning Council: Its Origins and Future Role, 13 ENVTL.
L. 673, 678-79 (1983) (noting Bonneville's "de facto dominance of regional energy matters").
59. "It's the only federal agency with a field office in Washington, in the words of one congressional aide." K. LEE & D. KLEMKA, ELECTRIC POWER AND THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC NonniWEST 189 (with M. Marts 1980). See also C. MCKINLEY, UNCLE SAM IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
160-61 (1952).
60. See S. REP. No. 93-1030, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974).
61. See The Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act, Pub. L. No. 93454, 16 U.S.C.
{§ 838 - 8381 (1982).
62. See 16 U.S.C. 8381(6) (1982). Bonneville is obligated to include planned expenditures in a
budget submitted to Congress, and Congress may limit Bonneville expenditures. 16 U.S.C. § 838i(a)
(1982).
63. Hittle, Larson, Randall & Michie, Pacific Northwest Power Generation, Multi-Purpose Use of
the Columbia River, and Regional Energy Legislation: An Overview, 10 ENva. L. 235, 238 (1980).
64. Id.
65. See Mellem, Darkness to Dawn? Generating and Conserving Electricity in the Pacific Northwest A Primer on the Northwest Power Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 245, 24748 (1983); Redman, Nonfirrn
Energy and BPA's Industrial Customers, 58 WASH. L. REV. 279 (1983).
66. See Bodi, FERC's Mid-Columbia Proceeding: Ten Years and Still Counting, 16 Own_ L.
555 (1986).
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2. The Origins of Regional Control
In the 1970's, Bonneville and the Northwest utility community
saw a crisis looming. The region's major hydropower sites were already developed, and expensive thermal generating plants (primarily
nuclear and fossil-fueled) were thought to be the primary source of
power for the future. The bleak prospect of financing these expensive
facilities prompted some of the region's utilities to seek to expand their
access to the federal system's inexpensive hydropower. With this, the
region was faced with not only a power shortage, but also the threat of
"a region-wide civil war over federal hydropower entitlements."' To
avoid this conflict, legislative authority was sought to allow Bonneville
to acquire power, easing supply problems by expanding the pool of
federal power" and defusing tensions over its allocation. However,
there was strong concern that with additional authority, Bonneville
would become a regional "energy Czar."" The region has a history of
hostility to comprehensive federal development authority proposals,
primarily due to concerns over federal interference with state water
authorities." The question was how to expand Bonneville's power
narrowly, and at the same time improve the region's ability to develop
new energy resources wisely.
The solution initially proposed was to expand Bonneville's authority, but to create a regional entity as a check. A regional council
would be created as a forum for resolving regional disputes in energy
matters. The legislation would pull the states into a comprehensive
energy planning process, overcoming some of the region's geographical and political balkanization and constraining Bonneville's
authority."
It soon became clear, however, that congressional approval would
come at a price. For many years, the Columbia River dams had produced low-cost power at the expense of the river's fish and wildlife,
67. Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 228 (1983).
68. H. REP. No. 96-976, pt. II, 96th Cong., 2d Sen. 35 (1980); H. REP. No. 96-976, pt. 1, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1980). Before passage of the Act, Bonneville assisted in resource development
only through complex bookkeeping transactions. See City of Springfield v. Washington Public Power
Supply Sys., 752 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); Continental III. Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Washington, 696
F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1983), appeal dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 1762 (1983). This method of financing
became impractical despite a perceived crisis in the region's need to develop additional resources. See
Hittle, supra note 62, at 271; Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 435, 670 P.2d 839, 842 (1983).
69. H.R. REP. No. 96-976, pt. I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1980).
70. See Volkman, Testing New Forms of River Basin Governance: Implications of the Seattle
Master Builders Case, 17 Dorm L. 835, 842 (1987).
71. See Memorandum from Public Power Council, Northwest Investor-owned Utilities, BPA's
Direct Service Industries, State of Oregon, and City of Seattle to Dave Finnegan and Andy Athy, at 2-4
(Sept. II, 1980).
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particularly its renowned salmon and steelhead runs. Throughout the
1970's, Indian and non-Indian fishermen had been at swords' points
over the right to harvest fish under a series of 1855 treaties. As fish
runs diminished in the face of hyrdopower and other development, the
tribes brought suits that threatened to restrict development that degraded fish habitat.' The Columbia River dams, which present lethal
obstacles to migratory salmon and steelhead, were a logical target."
If the region was to avoid the restrictive impact of these suits, and
secure the energy legislation it needed, it had to address these
problems.'
a. The Northwest Power Act
In 1980, Congress passed the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act ("the Northwest Power Act"). 78 In
the Act, Congress consented to an interstate compact among the four
Northwest states (Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington), to be
administered by the Northwest Power Planning Council. The Act
makes the Council accountable in distinct ways. Members of the
Council are appointed by the governors of the states,' and state authorities are expressly protected." The Council is subject to extensive
public involvement requirements. 78 Funding for the Council, derived
from a portion of Bonneville's revenues, is subject to review by Bonneville when it exceeds a prescribed level."
The Council has three responsibilities. First, Congress reacted to
the urgency of fish and wildlife problems m by directing the Council to
develop a program to help fish and wildlife, particularly salmon and
steelhead runs affected by hydroelectric dams in the Columbia River
Basin." In formulating this program, the Council must deal with the
72. See Blumm, Why Study Pacific Salmon Law? 22 10A00 L. REV. 629, 636-37 (198546).
73. See Authority of Bonneville Power Administrator to Panicipate in Funding of Program to Help
Restore the Columbia River Anadromous Fishery, 83 I.D. 589 (Nov. 22, 1976).
74. See generally Blumm & Johnson, Promising A Process For Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act and Anadromous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497 (1981).
75. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1982).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(aX2).
77. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839(5)(A), 839g(a). Particularly, they are protected in the area of water rights
(16 U.S.C. § 839g(h)), energy regulation (16 U.S.C. § 839g(a)), and fish and wildlife (16 U.S.C.
§§ 839b(h)(2), (6XA), and (7)).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(g).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(cX10).
80. "The conservation and enhancement of the great migratory fish and wildlife populations of
the Pacific Northwest, something of great concern to the sportsmen and conservationists of this Nation
are, for the first time, a matter of urgent priority under this legislation." 126 CONG. REC. H10680 (daily
S. Nov. 17, (980) (statement of Congressman Dingell).
81. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h).
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Columbia River and its tributaries as a system,' must protect fish and
wildlife and their spawning grounds and habitat, and must adopt
measures (including improved river flows) to help the production, migration, and survival of salmon and steelhead." The program is to
focus on biological objectives; cost becomes a factor in selecting fish
and wildlife protection measures only if less costly measures can accomplish the "same sound biological objective,"" or if a measure is
inconsistent with an "economical" power supply."
Second, Congress directed the Council to prepare a plan to meet
energy demands that may be placed on Bonneville." The plan is to
consist of a "general scheme" for acquiring energy, considering environmental quality, compatibility with the existing regional power system, and protection, mitigation and enhancement of fish and
wildlife." The plan must include only "cost effective" resources, giving first priority to energy conservation, second priority to renewable
resources, third priority to generating resources using waste heat or
high efficiency resources, and fourth priority to all other resources."
"Cost-effectiveness" requires a determination that a resource will be
reliable and available within the time it will be needed, and have the
lowest economic and environmental cost compared to other alternatives." For purposes of this cost-effectiveness determination, conservation measures are weighted more heavily because of their flexibility,
reliability, and attractive environmental qualities." The Act's resource priorities are to be implemented through the use of a number of
specific devices, including a 20-year demand forecast, the creation of a
portfolio of resources available to meet that anticipated demand,
model conservation standards, and other energy conservation and
planning measures.'
Finally, Congress directed the Council to encourage broad public
involvement in developing the power plan and the fish and wildlife
program.' For many years the region's power system had operated
largely out of the public eye, and decisions with enormous conse82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(IXA).
16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(hXIXA) and (6XE).
16 U.S.C. § 839b(hX6XC).
16 U.S.C. § 839b(hX5).
16 U.S.C. § 839b(eXI).
16 U.S.C. § 839(eX2).
16 U.S.C. § 839(eXI).
16 U.S.C. § 839a(4XA).
16 U.S.C. § 839a(4XD).
16 U.S.C. § 839b(eX3).
16 U.S.C. §§ 839(3XA), 839b(g).
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quences for ratepayers had been made with little public debate. 93 In
response, an entire section of the Northwest Power Act is devoted to
public involvement requirements, which apply to both the Council and
Bonneville."
The Council's power plan and fish and wildlife program guide
and constrain Bonneville and other federal agencies. Bonneville must
use its "fund and other authorities" to protect fish and wildlife in the
Columbia River Basin consistently with the Council's fish and wildlife
program and energy plan." Bonneville's share of the cost of the fish
and wildlife program becomes a cost of producing power, which is
included in its revenue requirement. 96 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission," the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and other federal agencies involved in the hydropower
system must take the fish and wildlife program "into account at each
relevant stage of decision-making processes to the fullest extent practicable."" Under this provision, the FERC has authority to implement
the Council's fish and wildlife program by imposing costs on non-federal project owners, or by determining that certain costs should be
borne by Bonneville."
Bonneville is the primary implementor of the Council's power
plan. Energy resources acquired by Bonneville must be consistent
with the plan,' and major resource acquisitions are subject to Council review.'°' Bonneville must also award billing credits to its customers who develop resources consistent with the power plan,' assist its
93. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL ELECTRIC POWER: A FIVE YEAR STATUS REPORT ON THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER ACT 50 (1987).
94. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(g).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(11)(10)(A).
96. See 16 U.S.C. § 839(4) (Bonneville customers and their consumers must "pay all costs" of
producing power); H.R. REP. No. 96-976, pt. I, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 49 (1980) (BPA customers and
consumers to pay all costs, including fish and wildlife costs).
97. The Commission licenses and regulates nonfederal hydroelectric power development in the
Basin. See 16 U.S.C. § 797 (1982).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(hX1IXAXii) (1982). The Council interprets this language to require these
agencies either to provide the Council with plans indicating that the agency intends to implement the
program, or provide explanations why "it will not be physically, legally, or otherwise practicable to
implement the program measures, including a description of all possible allowances available to permit
implementation." Northwest Power Planning Council, Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, § 1203(aX4) (1987). This interpretation is based in part on legislative history indicating that "Ulf
Ian agency] rejects the implementation of any measure contained in the program, they should indicate
in writing the basis for that decision so that all parties will have a basis for understanding the decision."
H. REP. No. 96-976, pt. II, 96th Cong., 2d Sass. 46 (1980).
99. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11XAXii).
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 839d(bX1).
101. See 16 U.S.C. § 839d(c).
102. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 839d(c), 839d(h).
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customers (financially and otherwise)'" to implement the model conservation standards,' and develop conservation measures and renewable resources that Bonneville determines are consistent with the
Council's plan.' The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission also
considers the power plan in its licensing processes.'
Although federal agencies are cast in the role of implementors of
regional policies, the Council also carries out federal policies. National policies and interests such as energy conservation,' fish and
wildlife conservation,' the legal rights of Indian tribes,' environmental quality,' and public utility preference,' have special emphasis under the Act and in the Council's planning. Rather than being a
reaction against federal interests, then, the Act created a way for the
region to weave federal interests into the region's plans.
b. The Constitutional Challenge to the Act

When the idea of the Northwest Power Planning Council was
first presented, the U.S. Department of Justice objected, contending
that a state-based council could not constitutionally tell federal agencies what to do."' The drafters of the Act sought to respond to these
concerns, but Justice remained opposed, and its opposition formed the
basis for a constitutional challenge shortly after the Council adopted
its power plan in 1983. Justice was not the primary challenger in
1983." 3 A group of homebuilders challenged the plan's model conservation standards,"4 relying on arguments Justice had developed when
the Act was being considered by Congress. In Seattle Master Build103.See 16 U.S.C. if 839b(f XI), 839d(aX1).
104.See 16 U.S.C. § 839d(aX1XC).
105.See 16 U.S.C. § 839d(aX1).
106. Under the Electric Consumers Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986),
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must base its licensing decisions on a comprehensive plan
for the waterway. See 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982). The Commission has recognized that the fish and
wildlife program and the power plan are "comprehensive plans." Utah Power & Light Co., Proj. No.
2381-001, 40 F.E.R.C. 61,139, 61,407 (1987).
107. 16 U.S.C. if 839b(e) and (1).
108. 16 U.S.C. if 839b(eX2XC) and (h).
109. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(hX6XD).
110. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(eX2XA).
III. 16 U.S.C. § 839g(c).
112.See Hemmingway, supra note 58, at 680-81.
113. Bonneville and the Department of Justice intervened in the case to "uphold" the Council's
constitutionality, urging the court to hold that the Act granted the Council no real authority over
Bonneville, so no constitutional issue was raised. See Weissberg, Seattle Master Builders: The Rush to
Judgment, 17 ENvn... L. 815 (1987).
114. The Council is required to include in its power plan model conservation standards designed
"to produce all power savings that are cost-effective for the region and economically feasible for consumers." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(f XI). The standards developed by the Council were accompanied by a
recommendation that Bonneville impose a surcharge on any customer that did not implement conserva-
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ers," 5 the homebuilders argued that because of the Council's authority
with respect to federal agencies, Council members were federal officials whose appointments must be approved by the President of the
United States. The challenge was based on a dictum in a 1976
Supreme Court case, Buckley v. Valeo," 6 which suggested that the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution"' requires "any appointee
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States" to be appointed by the president."'
The drafters of the Northwest Power Act were aware of the
Buckley v. Valet' dictum, but they were also aware of instances in
which Congress had delegated to the states authority over federal activities." 9 In one of the clearest cases, the Supreme Court held in
California v. United States,'" that section 8 of the Reclamation Act
required the Secretary of the Interior to follow state water law in developing a federal reclamation project (the New Melones Dam). 121
Although the project was to be built by the Secretary of the Interior
with federal funds on federal land, it was entirely permissible for Congress to require compliance with state law in appropriating and distributing project water.'22
The challengers in Seattle Master Builders addressed a somewhat
different question, however. They argued that there is a distinction
don measures that would achieve energy savings comparable to those that would be achieved by the
model standards.
115. Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific N.W. Elec. Power & Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 939 (1987).
116. 424 U.S. 1(1916).
117. "[The President] shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls. Judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Court of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
118. 424 U.S. at 125-26.
119. See Hemmingway, supra note 58, at 682. Until 1875, state courts were the sole forums for
trial of federal question cases. See Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470.
Local school boards expend federal funds under federal education aid programs. See, e.g., Title I
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. if 2701-3386 (1982). The Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978), delegated regulatory and enforcement powers to state authorities and nonregulated utilities. In Federal
Energy Regulatory C,omm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), reh tg denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982), the
Supreme Court upheld the PURPA arrangement.
120. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
121. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 provides that in carrying out federal irrigation
programs, the Secretary of the Interior "shall proceed in conformance with" state laws "relating to the
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired
thereunder." 32 Stat. 390 (1902) (codified at 43 U.S.C. ¢§ 372 and 383 (1982)). The New MeMnes
Dam is part of the California Central Valley Project, authorized by the Flood Control Acts of 1944 and
1962, 58 Stat. 901 (1944) and 76 Stat. 1191 (1962).
122. California, 438 U.S. at 664.
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between general state laws that Congress chooses to apply to federal
agencies, and state regulation that Congress applies to federal agencies
alone. They distinguished California v. United States:
California v. U.S. might be relevant if the Council had been empowered to require [the Bonneville Power Administration] and
state, local, and private utilities to acquire resources through conservation as required by the Council's Plan. However, the Council
is only empowered to tell [Bonneville] what to do.'"
The Council, on the other hand, argued that the Constitution ex-

pressly recognizes interstate compacts, 124 which by definition may
"limit, or infringe upon a full and complete execution by the [federal]
Government, of the powers intended to be delegated by the Federal
Constitution."I25
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit gave an unequivocal answer to the
challenge. The Council is an interstate compact agency. It exercises
its own authority, not federal authority; without state legislation approving the compact, no authority would exist. 126 The court was not
troubled by the fact that Congress consented to the compact in advance, or that the Council's activities "directly affect a federal
agency."'27
The legal merits of the opinion are analyzed elsewhere, 128 and it is
not our purpose to add to that commentary. It is important, however,
to underscore the court's basic holding: The arrangement represented
by the Northwest Power Planning Council is a flexible, constitutional
device. Whether different versions of this arrangement would be upheld in other circuits is to some extent speculative, but the Seattle
Master Builders opinion offers clear support for state-based basin
councils to guide federal activities and hydropower revenues.
HI. BASIN COUNCILS FOR OTHER REGIONS
There are important differences between water problems in general and the problems the Northwest Council deals with, and impor123. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 72-73, Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (No State shall, without the consent of Congress, ... enter

into any Agreement or Compact with another State... ."). See generally Frankfurter & Landis, The
Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
125. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
126. Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1363-66.
127. Id. at 1363-64.
128. See Goble, The Council and the Constitution: An Ankle on the Constitutionality of the
Northwest Power Planning Council, 1 J. Erma. L & LMGATION II, 39 (1986); and Stumm, The
Appointments Clause. Innovative Federalism, and the Constitutionality of the Northwest Power Planning
Council, 8 J. ENERGY L. & PoCit 1 (1987). A symposium on Seattle Master Builders appears in 17
Dorm. I,. No. 4 (1987).
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tant differences from one region to another. Nevertheless, for
purposes of discussion we describe what a "generic" basin council for
water policy might look like, starting with the Northwest Council as a
template:'"
— A revolving fund resembling the Bonneville Power Administration fund would receive power revenues from the basin's federal
dams.
— Congress would consent to the creation of a basin council by
interstate compact. State participation in the compact would be
authorized by state legislation, and the council's members would
be appointed by the governors of the member states.
— The council would undertake strategic planning for the federal
power and reclamation systems of the basin, which would include
demand forecasting and the examination of supply options, and
would identify suitable investments for hydropower revenues in
the revolving fund.
— The basin council would be subject to strong public involvement obligations.
— The activities of federal agencies operating or regulating the
basin's hydropower and reclamation facilities should be consistent
with the plan adopted by the basin council.

At a general level this model offers three incentives. First, it
would provide access to funds for strategic water initiatives. As the
federal budget is cinched tighter, this avenue of funding could become
increasingly significant. Second, it would offer the basin states a way
to integrate federal, state, tribal, and other water interests. Particularly in an era when states may see initiative in water policy shifting to
federal water programs,' the ability to integrate policy in a stateappointed forum could be a significant incentive."' Third, strong
public involvement obligations could expand and stabilize the social
foundation of water policy, building on a more inclusive range of political debate than has informed the federal system in the past. At a time
when federal water policy is seeking new political and economic moorings, basin councils may offer a foundation for achieving a new con129. This discussion is drawn from a report co-authored by Dr. Lee and published by the Western
Governors' Association. See LEE & CLARK, supra note 46, at 26.
130. See Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. Cow. I... REV. 317 0985).
131. Basin councils, for example, might provide a process to address Commerce Clause questions
raised by state regulation of water supplies. In Sportiest v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941
(1982), the Supreme Court held that water is an article of commerce, and that a Nebraska ban on
groundwater exportation violated the Commerce Clause. The majority opinion also recognized that
arid western states have a valid interest in conserving water, however, and this interest may help justify
state laws that burden commerce. See Tarlock, So It's Nov Ours—Why Can't We Still Keep It? A First
Look at Sporhase v. Nebraska, 18 lAwo & WATER L Rev. 137 (1983). A plan emphasizing conservation on an interstate basin scale might supply a foundation for asserting legitimate state interests.
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sensus. Taken together, these incentives would offer cooperating states
an unprecedented opportunity for new initiatives in western water
policy.
Coupled with these incentives are a number of uncertainties, however, which fall into two general categories. First, funding questions
could influence the potential effectiveness of basin councils. Second
are questions relating to the viability of basin councils in the supercharged political atmosphere of western water policy. These uncertainties do not undermine the idea of basin councils, but do help focus
the debate.
A. Funding Questions

I. Defining the Uses of Basin Funds
The Northwest Power Act calls for electric power revenues to be
invested with the interests and obligations of electric ratepayers foremost in mind. For example, investments in energy conservation are
suitable if they are less costly"2 than other alternatives, resulting in a
savings for ratepayers. Investments in fish and wildlife are made in
recognition of the power system's adverse effects on those resources.'"
On the other hand, the Act provides no warrant for the use of power
revenues unrelated to ratepayer interests or obligations. Funding a
water project without any benefits to electric ratepayers or to fish and
wildlife for which the power system is responsible would be inappropriate. The question is whether this distinction between permissible
costs (reflecting the long-term interests and obligations of ratepayers)
and impermissible costs should apply to basin councils.
There is an argument that the distinction should not apply, that it
is appropriate to use power revenues for purposes unrelated to the direct interests and obligations of electric ratepayers. As has been seen,
using hydropower revenues for purposes external to the power system
is not a new idea. The reclamation program grew up on the promise
that hydropower revenues would defer a significant part of water project costs. Congress has also authorized the use of hydropower revenues to correct salinity problems caused by repeated use of water for
irrigation,' for comprehensive river planning, energy conservation,'" municipal water supply," 6 and fish and wildlife measures.'
132 Less costly, that is, in the long term, in both economic and environmental terms. See supra
discussion accompanying notes 89-90.
133. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(8)(B) (1982). In appropriate circumstances, the Council may call
For the investment of electric power revenues in fish and wildlife measures away from the site of hydropower projects. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(hX8)(A) (1982).
134. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1571-1599 (1982).
135. 43 U.S.C. § 618a(d) (1982) (Colorado River Development Fund).
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These expenditures can be justified under the view that federal dams
are national assets whose revenues ought to be used for national purposes. If Congress' judgment is that non-power purposes merit funding through hydropower revenues, that may be perfectly appropriate.
On the other hand, there are both equitable and practical arguments for retaining the distinction in the context of water projects. Is
it fair to ask electric ratepayers to pay for something that probably will
not benefit them? The benefits of water projects are usually localized:
water cannot be distributed as widely as electric power can be. The
chances that an Arizona ratepayer would benefit from an investment
of revenues in the Upper Colorado River Basin are slim. Moreover,
hydropower revenues are limited (as discussed below), and could not
conceivably finance all western water needs single-handedly. Accordingly, even if hydropower revenues were available for non-power purposes, sharply-defined limits would have to be placed on their use.
Limiting the use of hydropower revenues to uses involving the interests and obligations of ratepayers is a reasonable rule of this kind.
The special characteristics of nonstructural water solutions may
point to a middle ground. To the extent that nonstructural solutions
leave more water in a river, they may have broader benefits than do
traditional water storage projects. For example, water conservation
may augment river flows, allowing more hydropower generation, helping fish and wildlife, providing more recreational benefits, and allowing additional downstream municipal and industrial water use.
River basin ratepayers may be a logical group to finance this spectrum
of benefits. The likelihood that these benefits will occur (i.e. the likelihood that water conservation will augment instream flows) should be
tested, and this test may illuminate the difficulties of measuring, allocating and securing these instream benefits. But if these benefits can be
obtained, gains to the basin's economy and quality of life could be
substantial, and the use of power revenues to finance nonstructural
measures might be justified. Drawing an analogy to electric conservation measures under the Northwest Power Act, nonstructural water
measures might be accorded a quantitative priority in determining
which measures are more cost-effective than others.'"
2. Coordinating Basin Funds With Other Financing
Hydropower revenues might make only a dent in critical western
water needs. The Western Area Power Administration's revenues are
136. 43 U.S.C. § 620d(d)(2) (1982).
137. 43 U.S.C. § 620d(d)(5) (Upper Colorado River Basin Fund).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
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in the neighborhood of $630 million per year, just over one-fifth of
Bonneville's revenues.'" WAPA's revenues are generated by projects
in river basins throughout the West, including the Colorado, the Missouri, and the Sacramento-San Joaquin. WAPA's revenues would
have to be shared among these areas. At the start, then, basin councils
in the Missouri or Colorado basins would be dealing with substantially
smaller basin funds than in the Northwest.
The size of these funds may change because there is elasticity in
electric power rates, and there may be more elasticity in some areas
than others. Financial pressures on WAPA are lighter than on Bonneville. Bonneville's rates increased by more than 600 percent in the
1979-84 period,' and the agency has had to struggle to make payments on its debt to the U.S. Treasury. WAPA has not experienced
rate increases of this scale, and is either on or ahead of schedule in
repaying its Treasury debt."' Its rates are low, just over half of
Bonneville's. 142 Much of WAPA's power is used by its customers for
peaking purposes, which has a relatively high market value."
WAPA's rates may be able to absorb additional obligations imposed
by new investments.
Whatever the degree of rate flexibility, electric power revenues
probably could not meet all western water funding needs, and a more
diverse portfolio of financing alternatives would be needed.'" Federal
appropriations must continue to play a role in funding. Navigation,
flood control, and agricultural production are important to the nation's commerce and security, and funding for these purposes is legitimately a national function. User fees must account for a much higher
part of project costs than they have in the past. State funding should
reflect the states' vital interests in stable water supplies for existing
uses and future growth. If benefits for downstream municipal and industrial water needs can be secured from investments in headwater
areas, municipal and industrial users should pay accordingly. Hydropower revenues and basin councils could play a strategic role, helping
139. See Enemy and Water Development Appropriations for 1988: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Energy and Water Development of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4,
at 1222 (1987).
140. See LEE & CLARK, supra note 46, at 8.
141. Id. at 9.
142. See Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1988: Hearings before the Subcomrn.
on Energy and Water Development of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st Seas., pt. 6,
at 1474, 1620 (1987) (showing a composite rate for all western sales in fiscal year 1986 at 13.61 mills per
kilowatt hour, compared to Bonneville's average rate of 20 mills).
143. See LEE & CLARK, supra note 46, at 27.
144. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER ISSUES FACING THE NATION: AN
OVERVIEW 23-25 (1982).
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to integrate these federal, basin, state, and local interests, identifying
solutions with the least economic and environmental cost, and contributing funding to promising solutions.
3. Constriction of Funds by the Federal Deficit
The federal budget deficit poses a three-fold challenge to the financial resources available to basin councils. First, federal funding for
western water programs, which has been in a virtually unrelieved decline since the early 1970's, holds little prospect of improvement.'
Indeed, with rapidly growing operation and maintenance charges for
existing federal facilities, congressional funding for operation and
maintenance costs will also be at risk. Basin councils might be forced
to devote hydropower revenues to investments that previously were
financed with federal appropriations.
Second, there have been repeated proposals that the federal government sell the power marketing administrations. In 1983, the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, the "Grace
Commission," proposed that the Columbia River power dams be
soat46
The budget deficit would thereby be trimmed with a lump
sum payment from purchasers, and the continuing annual subsidies
implicit in low-interest loans with discretionary repayment schedules
would be extinguished.' These proposals have resulted in the pending divestiture of one power marketing administration, the Alaska
Power Administration. Congress has placed a moratorium on divestiture studies for other power marketing administrations, but this may
be temporary; further divestiture proposals may be waiting in the
wings. 148
The third challenge comes from pressures to increase hydropower
repayments to the federal treasury. Not long after the Grace Commission report, liberal Congresswoman Barbara Boxer of California proposed that power from Hoover Dam be auctioned at market rates, and
the extra income used to reduce the federal deficit. Although the proposal failed to pass, the voting margin on the floor of the House was a
145. See Woanka, supra note 6, at 306 (reporting remarks of Senator Moynihan: "Not a single
major water-authorization bill ... had been passed by Congress in the decade after 1972. The Corps of
Engineers was without work, and the Bureau was merely finishing up old projects.").
146. See PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY ON COST CONTROL, REPORT ON PRIVATIZAnom (1984).
147. The Commission also recommended that all future hydropower development should be financed from non-Federal sources. Id.
148. See Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1988: Hearings before the Subeomm.
on Enew and Water Development of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st Seat, pt. 6,
at 1361-68 (1987).
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narrow twenty votes.'" In 1985, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) proposed that interest rates on the U.S. Treasury's investment in the federal power system in the Northwest be sharply increased. Decrying the "cushy deal" whereby the Northwest benefitted
from low interest federal loans and long-term, flexible repayment
terms, OMB proposed that Bonneville's repayment obligation be
doubled and put on a fixed schedule. m Estimated rate increases implicit in the proposal were as high as eighty percent' s ' Under congressional pressure, the OMB plan was shelved.
The same threat emerged in 1987. After making substantial inroads on the Administration's proposals to accelerate repayment
schedules, the Senate Budget Committee reached a compromise that
made no specific mention of increased repayment by power marketing
administrations. The committee did, however, call for more than $1.1
billion in budget cuts or increased revenues,' 52 giving instructions to
the committee with jurisdiction over the power marketing administrations and other western revenue-producing programs ' 53 to find the
savings. The West had an opportunity to catch its breath when the
administration's fiscal year 1989 budget did not propose further increases in repayments.
Three lessons can be drawn from these developments. The first is
obvious: federal funds for water projects will continue to be scarce.
Rather than counting on federal funds for new projects, the West will
do well to secure federal funding for operation and maintenance costs
for existing projects, and to find other sources of funding for new
water initiatives. The second lesson is that the western basins may be
forced either to purchase the power marketing administrations, or see
the administrations sold to private bidders. If western basins make
their own bids for the administrations, something like a basin council
arrangement would be an appropriate way to govern the new western
hydropower entities, and to direct the investment of hydropower revenues. The third lesson is that if the power marketing administrations
are not sold, hydropower will be under increasing pressure to help
reduce the federal deficit, probably through straight-line repayment,
149. See LEE & CLARK, supra note 46, at 16.
150. See TOLLEFSON, supra note 33, at 412.
151. Id.
152. See Memorandum from Betsy Moler to Joint Committee Staff, Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources (May 5, 1987).
153. See 133 CONG. REC. 55988-94 (daily S. May 6, 1987). The other revenue-producing programs included in this mandate were "shared receipts" programs (timber and mineral), and grazing
programs.
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possibly at higher interest rates. This would reduce the pool of revenues available for water investments.
These trends may not be irresistible, however, and they are shortsighted. Using hydropower revenues for strategic water improvements
could produce significant benefits in the West, and at the same time
reduce political and financial pressures on the federal government to
address western water problems. After all, Western water problems
are not merely local problems. The federal government has been a
partner in western water development because there are important national interests and responsibilities involved. Basin councils might assume some of these responsibilities, weave national interests into basin
plans, and relieve pressures on the federal treasury. In this way, basin
councils may represent a much more productive investment of hydropower revenues than would federal deficit reduction.

B. The Political Viability of Basin Councils
There is strong interest in the West in least-cost water solutions,
and recognition that these solutions will require coordinated planning
and investment.' 54 There is a question, however, whether this interest
extends to planning and investment on a river basin scale. The question for other basins, as it was for the Northwest, is whether the benefits of coordinated action hold enough promise to overcome differences
among basin states. The basin council we have outlined would not be
autocratic, but contemplates a shared approach to natural resource
problems.'" Federal agencies, state agencies, Indian tribes and others
must be willing to seek low-cost, environmentally-sound water and
power solutions, and must see a coordinated, basinwide program as
being the best way to do so.
It is by no means apparent that a cooperative interstate approach
is politically possible; water in the West may be too precious, and conflicts too bitter. There are wide disparities among states in geography,
economics, population, and climate. These differences spell fundamentally divergent interests in water. Discrepancies in water project
benefits received by upper Missouri basin states and lower basin states
154. See Getches, Pressures for Change in Western Water Policy, in WATER AND THE AMERICAN
WEST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RAPHAEL 3. MOSES 143, 157-62 (D. °etches S. 1988). Recent reports of
the Western Governors' Association also stress the need for water planning. WESTERN GOVERNORS'
ASSOCIATION WATER EFFICIENCY WORKING GROUP, WATER EFFICIENCY: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 112 (1987). See also WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, WATER CONSERVATION AND WESTERN WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (1984); LEE & CLARK, supra note 46; B. DRIVER, WESTERN
WATER: TUNING THE SYSTEM (1986).
155. Hemmingway, supra note 58, at 695.
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are perceived as significant, for example,'" and there may be deep

disagreement over future water initiatives. These differences would
complicate tile fashioning of a cooperative interstate body.
Because of these political complications, it may be worthwhile to
consider the idea of basin councils on a smaller scale. Congress might
authorize a single state to prepare a strategic plan for in-state federal
project operations and hydropower revenues. Such an arrangement
could address the energy, water, and environmental conditions unique
to the state or project, without facing the political complications of an
interstate council. The potential opportunities and efficiencies of interstate coordination would be foregone, and the insulation against constitutional attack provided by an interstate compact would be
missing,'" but the potential benefits of such an arrangement could still
be significant.
Whatever the scale, it is essential that the basin council's task,
and the constraints within which it must operate, be clearly defined,
particularly in relation to the existing rights and responsibilities of
others. The political balance that undergirds the Northwest Power
Act includes a framework of Indian and international treaties, power
system operating agreements, and case law that established a reasonably settled body of rules. The Act reaffirmed this framework, making
it clear that fundamental rights could not be upset by the Council and
that the Council would not be faced with the task of making fundamental changes or reallocating existing rights. In water policy, similar
care should be taken not to disturb existing rights. The Colorado
River Basin has a complex "Law of the River" under which a basin
council would have to operate Water rights and the authority of existing state water agencies should be preserved, as should federallybased rights such as Indian water or hunting and fishing rights, Endangered Species Act protections, and the like.
If Indian water rights were appropriately protected in basin council legislation, basin councils might be especially appealing to states
and Indian tribes concerned with Indian water rights and claims. One
of the central questions in western water policy is how to satisfy reserved Indian water rights without disrupting existing water uses.'"
The tribes want water, not just paper water rights. Many western
states would rather find creative solutions for tribal claims than risk
judicial decrees that could require more draconian measures to satisfy
See LEE & CLARK, supra note 46, at 13.
157. A single-state arrangement, however, might find sufficient authority under California v.
United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
158. For a discussion of how Indian water claims have evolved, see chapters 8 and 9 of MCCOOI,
COMMAND OF THE WATERS (1987).
156.
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senior Indian water rights. But the economic pressures that face western water projects can also block these creative solutions. Basin councils and hydropower revenues could play a role in finding these
solutions and making them work. The Northwest Power Act again
offers precedent, providing resources to rebuild the Columbia River's
anadromous fish runs and making the Basin's Indian tribes natural
allies of the Council.'" Basin councils could play a similar role in finding ways to replace the paper water rights of Indian tribes with real
water.
Whether federal agencies are likely to offer a friendly receptiiii
basin councils is also a key question. Inevitably, the Northwest council's relations with federal agencies have been characterized by some
tension, particularly in the Council's early years.' 6° One can hope that
federal water agencies would be more accommodating to basin councils. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation recently declared that it will
work with state and local agencies, Indian tribes, public interest
groups, and others to improve "management, efficiency, and conservation of water resources" in federal reclamation projects, and to rely on
dams only as a tool to achieve increased efficiencies.' 6 ' While the Bureau has not been put to the test on this commitment, this broad endorsement may bode well for the brand of cooperation implicit in
basin councils.
Each of these issues has branches and complexities that would
have to be worked out within the unique climate of each basin. The
concept of basin councils, however, is flexible. The viability of the concept is much more likely to be shaped by political forces than by intrinsic limitations in the basin council structure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Major federal water projects, part of the rush to settle the West,
were built on a scale that would have astonished even the early proponents of the reclamation system. If John Wesley Powell were to see the
reclamation program today,
159. See Volkman, The Columbia River Fisheries Thirteen Years After the Bold: Decision,
Anadrotnous Fish Law Memo No. 42 (Aug. 1987).
160. See Evans 8c Hemmingway, Northwest Power Planning: Origins and Strategies, 1 Nw.
Emv7L. J. I. 5(1984).
161. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN... A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 2 (1987). See afro U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ASSESSMENT '87 ii (1987) (describing the Bureau's intention to "emphasite resource management and opthniting use of existing Federal *MO
resource facilities," working with state and local agencies, Indian tribes, and private Mad public Snit
groups).
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(hie might get the impression that resurrection morn had really
dawned. All the great river systems—Missouri, Columbia, Colorado, Rio Grande, Sacramento-San Joaquin, and every tributary
branch and twig—have been surveyed and mapped in even greater
detail than he intended. Blue river lines are strung with the irregular blue beads of reservoirs or projected reservoirs, and the storage
dams, as well as the map symbols that record them and the topographic base map on which they are superimposed, are part of the
heritage that Powell left.m

If we adopted Powell's engineering vision, however, we gave decidedly short shrift to his notions of river basin government. We do
not suggest that the West can reclaim the ground that Powell stood
on. The river basins, with few exceptions, are divided among the
states, and that will not change. But we can think about how states
can guide the conservation and development of shared river basins.
Basin councils are descendants of Powell's idea of river basin government, adapted to the realities of state boundaries, and to the possibilities inherent in the new era of water management. The success of the
Northwest program so far suggests that federal, state, tribal and local
interests can approach water-related problems on a river basin scale,
using hydropower revenues for new initiatives.

162. STEGNER, supra note 12, at 353.

